The Sarbanes-Oxley Act inspired research on long-term high-integrity retention of business records, leveraging the immutability guarantees that WORM storage servers offer for files. In this paper, we present the transaction log on WORM (TLOW) approach for supporting long-term immutability for relational tuples. TLOW stores the transaction log on WORM and uses an audit helper (AH) add-on to continuously perform audit-related activities without compromising transaction performance or audit trustworthiness. TLOW imposes only 1-11% runtime overhead on TPC-C transactions, much less than previously proposed approaches, and does not require DBMS kernel changes. TLOW audits are extremely fast, e.g., two hours to audit a year of continuous TPC-C activity, versus 10 days for previously proposed approaches. This opens up the possibility of real-time internal audits that can detect fraudulent activity before its effects propagate throughout an enterprise. We also provide a proof of correctness for TLOW, which exposes a subtle threat that affects the correctness of previously proposed approaches.
INTRODUCTION
The drumbeat of financial accounting scandals, from ENRON in 2000 to Satyam Infotech in 2008, has prompted the introduction of regulations intended to guarantee the integrity of business records. For example, Wall Street firms are subject to Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 17a-4, and all medium and large US public companies are subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [4, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ASIACCS '11, March 22-24, 2011 , Hong Kong, China. Copyright 2011 ACM 978-1-4503-0564-8/11/03 ...$10.00. 19 ]. These regulations are intended to ensure the preservation of immutable copies of all business email, spreadsheets, and reports during a multi-year mandatory retention period. The penalties for non-compliance include hefty fines and potential jail terms.
To help companies comply with these regulations, all major storage vendors (IBM, EMC, NetApps, etc.) sell so-called WORM storage servers, which support a version of write-once-read-many semantics for files. On such devices, files are term-immutable; that is, once they are committed to the device, they are read-only for the duration of a predeclared retention period. The WORM semantics guarantee that during its retention period, not even an insider with system administrator privileges can delete or alter a file, shorten its retention period, or otherwise tamper with a WORM volume once it has been set up, short of physical attack. To ensure trustworthiness, WORM storage servers run their own file server code, do not run any user programs, have tamper-resistant clocks, and provide only a very narrow API for users and administrators. All medium and large US public companies use WORM storage servers to help them comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; they are the gold standard for term-immutable file storage. Further, they cost approximately the same amount as ordinary storage servers, which is very important: the high cost of retaining all business records for many years in a tamper-evident manner must be balanced against the benefit to society of increased accuracy in financial reporting and accountability for inaccuracies. Thus we would like to leverage WORM storage servers as the trusted computing base for supporting term-immutable relational tuples. However, because they support term-immutability only for entire files, WORM storage servers are not directly useful for providing term-immutability for fine-grained data such as tuples. It would be impractical to provide term-immutability by making every tuple a separate file, making a new copy of the database file on every update, or moving the DBMS functionality into the WOR-M storage server [16] . A DBMS that supports term-immutability must consist of untrusted code that communicates with the (trusted) WORM storage server over as narrow an interface as possible.
Recently, researchers have proposed a scheme for supporting term-immutability in databases [16] . This approach, called the log-consistent DBMS architecture (LDA), uses a transaction-time database (DB) to turn every tuple insert, delete, and update request into the creation of a new version of the tuple. LDA stores a DB snapshot on WORM at audit time, and keeps several other files on WORM: the tail of the current transaction log, the tail of the transaction log at the time of each crash since the last audit, and a "compliance" log file that records all DB changes since the last audit. The compliance log, the snapshot, and the transaction log tails are used at the next audit to check for tampered content in the current DB. Depending on the implementation, LDA may require small changes in the DBMS kernel. LDA has a small window of vulnera-bility (e.g., 5 minutes) between the time that a transaction commits and when its writes become term-immutable. LDA's performance overhead is relatively high: 10-20% decrease in TPC-C transaction throughput, depending on security guarantees; plus 2 weeks of time on dedicated hardware to audit a year of TPC-C activity.
The contributions of this paper are:
1. We introduce the transaction log on WORM (TLOW) architecture, a simpler and much more efficient approach to supporting term-immutable tuples, with no changes to the DBMS kernel. TLOW stores on WORM only the transaction log and the DB snapshot from the last audit. 2. We show that TLOW imposes 1-11% overhead in TPC-C transaction throughput (depending on the exact security guarantees), while at the same time reducing LDA's window of vulnerability by a factor of 5. For identical security guarantees, TLOW outperforms LDA by 10% in the TPC-C benchmark. 3. We prove the correctness of TLOW. The proof illustrates a number of subtle threats, as well as a correctness problem with LDA that we show how to fix. 4. We introduce the TLOW audit helper (AH), which reduces the cost of audits 100-fold (compared to LDA). This enables enterprises to perform frequent internal audits, without compromising the performance of their production workload. With early detection of fraudulent activity, corrections can be made before the effects of the fraud have propagated very far. 5. We show how to support forensic investigations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we discuss the threat model for long-term data retention in Section 2. We present the TLOW architecture in Section 3 and prove its correctness in Section 4, followed by the audit helper in Section 5, and a forensic analysis scheme in Section 6. We provide experimental results in Section 7, discuss related work in Section 8, and conclude in Section 9.
THREAT MODEL
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) seeks to ensure the detection of activity contributing to fraudulent financial reports [4] . In practice, such activity involves the history forgery, usually centering around tampering with revenues and expenditures for the previous financial reporting period. SOX and related regulations require the presence and enforcement of organizational policies and procedures to ensure that routine business records (including email, instant messages, spreadsheets, reports, and more) are captured at the time they are generated, and untampered software is used to process them. As shown in Figure 1 , once these records are captured, someone may still try to tamper with them. For example, a CEO may order or bribe a systems administrator to create phony purchase orders backdated to fall within the previous quarter, increase the quantities on certain legitimate purchase orders, delete certain expenditure records, and delete all email discussing the planning of the crime. SOX and related regulations seek to ensure that such tampering can be detected by a trusted auditor. When tampering is detected, regulations require organizations to launch an investigation, with potential prosecution of the guilty; thus adversaries want to perform undetectable tampering. We discuss the ramifications of such threats for relational data in the rest of this section.
Adversary model
We assume that an adversary Mala can tamper with any file (up to the limits, if any, imposed by the servers where those files reside). Since Mala may be a system administrator, she may be able to assume any user's identity and read, overwrite, append to, or delete any file, including database data, indexes, logs, and metadata. She can change the database's contents with a file editor, or by using a non-compliant DBMS to overwrite the contents of the database. She can crash the DBMS or storage server. She can tamper with the execution environment, such as by tampering with the clock on the DBMS or storage server (within limits discussed below), and change any other environmental parameters.
Trust assumptions
Transaction integrity. Since Mala can take on anyone's identity, in theory she can impersonate the DBMS when talking to a storage server, and append arbitrary material to the transaction log while the DBMS is running, so that the log contents no longer faithfully mirror the intent of the executing transactions. Such attacks cannot be used to forge history, but they are clearly undesirable, and they muddy the question of what a "correct" final state is. We require the DBMS and storage server to prevent such attacks on the current transaction log file, while the DBMS is up. This transaction integrity can be ensured by an appropriate combination of TPMs, mutual authentication, a secure communication channel, and non-advisory locking on the storage server side, so that only the DBMS can write to the transaction log while the DBMS is up, and so that messages between the DBMS and storage servers arrive promptly unless there is a crash. While the DBMS is down, Mala can append arbitrary material to the transaction log.
DBMS cache integrity. In theory, Mala can tamper with data residing in the DBMS page cache. We require those attacks to be prevented by installing kernel patches that keep processes, even those owned by root, from getting read-write access to other processes' memory [14] . The only way to bypass such patches is to replace the kernel and reboot the DBMS machine, which is hard to carry out without being detected. These patches ensure that when a new transaction arrives at the DBMS, it is correctly executed.
Trustworthy crash information. The auditor must have a trustworthy source of information about the time at the WORM server when each crash or shutdown occurred since the previous audit, and the time that normal transaction processing began or resumed. We believe that this assumption is reasonable because the crash of a production system will be a visible inconvenience at the application layer. Applications can note the relevant times in an error log on WORM. The auditor does not need to know the times of crashes 
Threats
History forgery attack. The main threat we face in long-term data retention is regret -i.e., where an adversary regrets the existence of a tuple in the database (or the absence of a tuple), and therefore launches a history forgery attack to undetectably remove or alter the regretted tuple (or insert a backdated tuple). As discussed in [16] , the history forgery threat has two parameters. The regret interval is the minimum time interval we can assume between when a tuple is committed to the database and an adversary tries to tamper with it. For post-hoc insertion of tuples (such as phony back-dated purchase orders), the regret interval is the minimum time interval we can assume between when a tuple was not committed to the database and when an adversary tries to insert it with a back-dated start time.
The query verification interval is the interval between the time a transaction reads data and the time when we determine whether that data had been tampered with.
In current legal interpretations of email compliance, the regret interval is zero, meaning that email must be archived on WORM before it is delivered to its recipient. In contrast, the current acceptable regret window for DB data is shockingly long: current practice is to dump a snapshot of the database contents to WORM periodically, making the regret interval at least a day long. Further, the query verification interval is infinity.The audits do not guarantee that transactions read only untampered data, or that the current DB state is in any sense correct. LDA and TLOW both aim to strengthen these guarantees without compromising production DB performance, through new techniques that will allow fast audits. In particular, a regret interval of a few seconds or minutes at the DBMS level represents a significant advance over current industrial practice.
Other threats. Compliance is a multi-faceted endeavor: every layer of the system needs to have its own safeguards to protect against attacks at that level. Traditional controls and techniques outside the scope of this paper are needed to help detect, analyze, and cleanup after traditional attacks against the DBMS and storage servers, including software and hardware errors and failure; denialof-service attacks; malicious transactions from legitimate users, either acting maliciously or innocently (cross-site scripting); and tampering with the DBMS, OS, or application software.
TLOW ARCHITECTURE
Design Overview. Our design goals for TLOW were to overcome the run-time and audit-time inefficiencies of LDA while preserving transaction throughput, minimizing space overhead, and avoiding changes to the DBMS kernel. The resulting Transaction Log on WORM (TLOW) DB architecture is very simple, consisting of a transaction-time layer atop an ordinary DBMS. As shown in Figure  2 (a), TLOW stores the current DB instance at an ordinary storage server. The snapshot from the previous audit, as well as the transaction log L since the last audit, reside at a WORM storage server. Legacy applications can run on a TLOW DB with no changes. All traditional SQL statements will work correctly, including deletions. New time-aware applications can query past states of the database by including an additional clause at the end of their SQL queries, describing the time point at which the queries should be run. Intuitively, TLOW DBs seem to have a zero regret interval: since L and the old snapshot are on WORM, an auditor should be able to tell if the current DB state is correct. The proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that this is incorrect, unless the WORM and DBMS servers have perfectly synchronized clocks.
Leveraging existing technology
In TLOW, we leverage existing technology using a number of refinements designed to thwart certain attacks by Mala.
Extending WORM storage servers. We require one extension to current WORM storage server interfaces, namely, the ability to append to term-immutable files located in a particular directory or volume, from the time that they are created until the first time they are closed. After the first closure, the file must remain read-only for the duration of its retention period. This simple extension makes it possible to append to a log file, while the older part of the same file is already term-immutable. Current WORM servers are software (or Firmware) WORM , so the append facility is an easy add-on.
Temporal constraint on transaction log segments. To support a TLOW regret interval of r time units, we require that the current L file be flushed to the WORM server every r/2 time units, and a new L file created. DBMSs already contain a function that can be called periodically to flush the current L file to disk, close it, and open a new file for L. This can be done by tuning the appropriate DBMS parameter, or by having a small application on the DBMS server machine that sleeps for r/2 time units, makes the call, and goes back to sleep. The periodic creation of a new log file is necessary for detecting clock tampering attacks on the DBMS server that can compromise the next audit. This is also a key difference between L-DA and TLOW -LDA requires that the DBMS and WORM servers clock's be roughly synchronized (i.e., within r/2 time units); TLOW does not impose any clock synchronization requirement.
Transaction-time databases. An auditor must be able to distinguish between data tampering and legitimate modifications. Therefore, TLOW retains all versions of a database tuple, using a layer of software above the DBMS that turns it into a transaction-time database [8, 11, 12, 21, 23] . In general, a transaction-time DBMS translates every tuple insertion, deletion, or modification into the insertion of a new version of the tuple, which is placed on the same page as the old tuple if possible. Unknown to legacy applications, each tuple has a start time attribute, giving the commit time of the transaction that inserted the tuple. Deleted tuples are identified by a special end-of-life version, whose start time is the commit time of the transaction that deleted the tuple. For such databases, the history forgery threat takes four forms: insertion of tuples with start times that already have passed, removal of tuples that have not yet expired, overwrites of existing versions of tuples, and updates to deleted tuples or tuple versions that are not the most recent.
Tuple shredding. At the end of its retention period, a tuple version may be shredded. We adopt the shredding approach proposed for LDA [16] , where a vacuuming process identifies expired tuple versions and removes them. To make shredding trustworthy, a small amount of information about shredded tuples is logged on WORM and checked at the next audit. As trustworthy shredding is orthogonal to the contributions of this paper, we do not consider it further.
Hash-page-on-read. An untamper attack occurs if Mala tampers with the values in the database, causing transactions to read incorrect data (and then possibly write incorrect data based on what they read), and then untampers the data before the next audit. For example, Mala may use a file editor to overwrite her salary in the DB and double it, right before a legitimate application gives employees a 10% raise. Then she can untamper the old version of the tuple, leaving the new version in place with its incorrect salary. To detect that Mala's final salary value is incorrect, we must detect that the raise transaction read tampered data. To prevent untamper attacks, we adopt the same hash-page-on-read approach originally proposed (for slightly different purposes) for LDA [16] . In a nutshell, we hash the tuples on each data page at the time the page is read from disk, and record the page ID and hash value on the transaction log.
Audit fundamentals
We consider only quiescent audits; non-quiescent audits can be performed using techniques used in non-quiescent checkpointing.
The tuple completeness check. Figure 2 (b) shows that at the end of a successful audit, the auditor writes a snapshot of the current database state and a cryptographic hash of its tuples to WORM storage, and signs them. The expiration of L files on WORM must be such that they will be retained until at least the completion of the next audit. During the next audit, a very simple procedure suffices if no crashes, transaction aborts, log file tampering, or DB tampering followed by untampering has occurred. In this case, the auditor checks the signature on the hash of the previous snapshot and generates new hashes from the current instance and from L, as described below. Intuitively, the audit succeeds if the hash from the old DB snapshot Do, plus the hash of all the new tuples introduced in L, is equal to the hash of the current instance Dc.
Appropriate hash functions. TLOW and LDA both require a cryptographically strong commutative incremental hash function H for hashing sets of tuples. For H, we use the ADD_HASH function proposed by Bellare and Micciancio [3] :
where h is a big (512 bits or more) secure one-way hash function and the sum is taken modulo a large number. H's security properties stem from it being pre-image resistant, i.e., given a set {a1, . . . , an}, one cannot efficiently find {b1, . . . , bm} ( = {a1, . . . , an}) such that H({a1, . . . , an}) = H({b1, . . . , bm}).
Using such a hash function, the auditor can incrementally compute a hash over Do and the new tuples in L, and Dc. Pre-image resistance ensures that the (slightly abusing notation) H(Do ∪ L) = H(Dc) if and only if Ds ∪ L = Dc. Each hash operation takes O(1) time. We can check whether Dc contains the right tuples in a single pass over Dc and L, plus a read of the signed hash of the previous snapshot. The total cost, including the time to write out the new signed snapshot and signed hash, is O(|Dc| + |L|). This asymptotic complexity is the same as for LDA, and is too high in practice to permit frequent internal audits. Later we will show how to reduce the audit cost by a factor of 100.
Audit Process
Pseudocode for the auditor is provided in Figures 3, 4 , 5, and 6. Next, we discuss how the auditor works.
Detecting tampered log files. The auditor's work (as shown in the Audit routine in Figure 3 ) begins with sanity checks on the contents of the log files; we focus here on those associated with crashes, which are in the GlobalSanityCheck routine ( Figure 4) .
The auditor consults her trusted list of crash and recovery times to find all pairs [k, k ], where k is the time of a crash or shutdown, and k is the time that the DBMS recovered and started accepting new transactions. A log file is part of the recovery log, written R, if its life span [create time, last write time] falls entirely inside [k, k ]. The auditor ignores all R files during the remainder of the audit. We reserve the notation L for log files generated during normal transaction processing, outside of recovery.
Tampering is indicated by any log file whose lifespan partially overlaps [k, k ]. Mala may have appended additional records to an existing log file after a crash. More precisely, any log file whose last write time is after k and before k and contains anything other than recovery-related information indicates tampering, as does any log file whose create time is before k and whose last write time is after k . If any of these is violated, the audit fails, and forensic analysis must be performed. After completing global sanity checks, the auditor can perform local sanity checks on each log file segment, and then continue on to the main tasks of the audit, being sure to ignore all R files. SanityCheck ( Figure 5 ) reads each log file segment L, and checks the COMMIT records of the transactions. The check (and consequently, the audit) fails if there are more than one COMMIT record for the same transaction, or a COMMIT record timestamp is before the create time of L or last write time of L. The auditor also checks if the last modification time of L is within r/2 time interval after its create time, and if any COMMIT record timestamp is within r/2 time interval before the create time of L, or after the last modification time of L. After checking the consistency Audit (T , CrashList, DB old , DBnew) 1: Let T be the sequence of transactionlogfiles in create time order 2: Let CrashList be the trusted list of crash and recovery events. 3: Let DB old be the snapshot from the last audit, and let DBnew be the current instance of the DB. {Extract recovery log R, no-crash transaction log L from T } 4: (L, R) ← Extract_Recovery_Log(T , CrashList) {Perform global sanity checks on transaction log files} 5: if (GlobalSanityCheck(L, R,CrashList) == AUDIT_FAIL) then Computing and matching log and DB hashes. In HashTransactionLog (Figure 6 ), the auditor parses L from beginning to end to find all the new tuples (more precisely, versions of tuples) inserted by transactions, and to determine which transactions committed. If a log record records the insertion of tuple t, she extracts t's timestamp field ts. Depending on the transaction-time DBMS used, ts may contain a transaction ID or transaction commit time. In some DBMSs, the transaction ID may be changed to the commit time after the tuple has gone out to disk and the transaction has committed. The auditor keeps a data structure recording the transaction IDs that she sees in the log, their commit timestamp (if any), and the new tuples inserted by that transaction. Here, we assume that the commit timestamp for a new tuple is given in the COMMIT log record for its transaction, and does not appear in the log before this point.
If ts is a transaction ID tid that she has not seen before, she starts a new data structure to record information about tid. If she has not seen a COMMIT record for tid yet, she adds t's key (exclusive of timestamp) and content to her data structure for tid, overwriting any content already stored there for k. (The overwrite is crucial, as only final values written by a transaction should be included in her hash.) When the auditor parses a COMMIT record for a transaction T with ID tid and commit timestamp ts, she hashes all of the tuples recorded in her data structure for tid and then deletes the structure. As L is used for recovery, all of T 's new tuples must appear on L before that COMMIT record. Any subsequent log records about tuples from T are irrelevant to the audit and are ignored. The auditor never hashes new tuples from aborted transactions; any tid data structures remaining at the end of scan are from such transactions. When she hashes the tuples in Dc, she must replace any transaction IDs she sees by the appropriate commit times. Finally, she hashes the old and new DB states, and does the tuple completeness check.
Other integrity checks. The auditor must also verify the integrity of all indexes, database pages, and the transaction log, using the ordinary integrity-checking utilities included with a commercial DBMS. This includes checking the slot pointers on each page, tuples sort order across the pages, tuple threading order, and other stored metadata (the magic number on the page, tuple count on the page, etc.). The auditor must also check that all indexes are set up properly and point to the appropriate tuples; otherwise, a tuple can be hidden from queries by suitable manipulations of the indexes.
Handling untamper attacks
In TLOW, we provide two techniques for handling untamper attacks. First, we use the hash-page-on-read technique introduced in [16] . For guaranteed detection of untamper attacks, the auditor must take additional steps when processing a hash-page-on-read or page split record on the log. She reconstructs the content that should have been on that page at that point (e.g., each tuple's timestamp or transaction ID, tuple values that are subsequently overwritten or aborted), and computes its hash. We can use the same auditor code for this purpose as LDA does [16] , so we do not repeat it here.
Unfortunately, hash-page-on-read is expensive: it adds roughly 10% to TPC-C run time, and requires an additional day of audit time per year. The second technique is probabilistic detection: if audits can be made significantly faster, then it is feasible for companies to run frequent audits. Note that the probabilistic aspect is simply how often audits are run; it is not about an audit's ability to detect tampering (each audit will always detect any tampering at the time of audit). For this, we propose a fast new audit technique in Section 5. The key idea is that any untamper attack in progress at audit time will be detected by a tuple completeness check, without hashpage-on-read. Frequent audits, e.g., a part of a nightly backup, will detect most untamper attacks, as most of them needs to persist for a significant amount of time to be effective.
Untampering attacks are unlikely in some records retention applications. For example, consider birth records, which in the US are maintained by low-level clerks in each county. When an underage athlete wants to compete in the Olympics, or an overage athlete wants to compete in a youth tournament, the clerk may be bribed to change the records. It is unlikely that the records will be untampered
if (L has two COMMIT records for the same transaction) then 3:
return AUDIT_FAIL 4:
if (L has a COMMIT timestamp before the create time or after the last write time of L) then 6:
return 
TLOW CORRECTNESS
Intuitively, two transaction-time databases are equivalent if they contain the same tuple versions, up to shuffling of timestamps. We must formalize this notion of "shuffling". Definition The timestamp normal form of a transaction-time DB is created by replacing all occurrences of the smallest timestamp in the entire DB by 0, the next smallest by 1, etc.
The order of timestamps created during normalization gives the serialization order of the transactions that originally created the DB.
Definition Two transaction-time DBs are equivalent if after timestamp normalization, they contain the same tuples.
There can be several different serial orders of a set of transactions that all result in the same final state. However, for our purposes it suffices to consider a single serial order. Definition Suppose that a database is created by running a set of transactions that commit in the order T1, . . . , Tn. The resulting database instance is correct if and only if it is equivalent to one obtained by running transactions T1, . . . , Tn in serial order on an initially empty database.
HashTransactionLog (L)
1: {Initialize list of current, committed, and previously seen transactions} 2: T xn ← {}; Seen ← {}; Committed ← {} 3:
{For each log file, scan records sequentially} 6:
for all (record ∈ L) do 7:
if (the record lists a tuple to be inserted) then 8:
txnID ← get_txn_ID(record) 9:
if ((txnID ∈ Committed) OR get_timeStamp(record) < last_audit_time)) then 10: continue 11:
end if 12:
if (txnID / ∈ Seen) then 13:
Seen ← Seen ∪ txnID 14:
T The proof of this theorem is quite complex, due to the many subtle potential attacks.
PROOF. First, we prove the theorem for the case where no previous audits have taken place. The goal is to show that, if:
1. no untamper attacks have happened, 2. the organization provides transaction integrity, 3. auditor knows when each DBMS crash and shutdown occurred, and when normal transaction processing started or resumed, and the audit succeeds; then the final DB state is equivalent to a correct final state. We prove this in two steps.
A. The auditor extracts the serialization order correctly. First, we show that the no-crash version of the logs produced in line 3 of the Audit routine could have produced the final DB state. Since the audit succeeded, all the auditor's log sanity checks must have succeeded. The trusted information about crash / shutdown and start / restart times allows her to distinguish between L and R files, and discard any L files that Mala may have created before the DBMS restarted. The auditor's sanity checks have eliminated the possibility that any pair of L or R files have overlapping life spans, or that any L files were written to after a DBMS crash/shutdown occurred and before the subsequent recovery and restart were completed. The checks also ensure Mala cannot have appended any records to L files after a crash or shutdown. Because of transaction integrity, we conclude that regardless of any crashes/shutdowns, the L files do correctly show committed transactions and corresponding tuples.
Further, the DBMS's log paradigm will have ensured that all tuples inserted by committed transactions were already on the log before the transaction committed, and before any subsequent crash or shutdown. Thus L files produced by a run with crashes or shutdowns are indistinguishable from those produced by a run where all active uncommitted transactions aborted at the time of each crash or shutdown, with one exception: the run with crashes or shutdowns may have started new L files more frequently than one without them. As that difference does not affect our arguments, in the remainder of the proof, we do not consider crashes or shutdowns.
The auditor's sanity checks ensure that each transaction has at most one COMMIT record, and the timestamps of such records appear in strictly increasing order in L. So the serial order T 1 , . . . , Tn must be the one used to construct the correct final state.
B. Hash over new tuples in L is equal to the hash over tuples inserted by T1, . . . , Tn. The audit has succeeded, so the auditor's hash of the new tuples in L produces the same value as a hash of the current DB state. We must prove that the auditor's hash of the new tuples in L produces the same value as a hash of the tuples obtained by running T1, . . . , Tn serially on an initially empty database. If these two hashes are the same, then by the properties of the hash function, the current DB state is equivalent to a correct final state.
Suppose that the two hashes disagree. Then there must be one tuple in the correct final state that is not included in the auditor's hash over new tuples in L, or vice versa. Let t be the first such tuple, which was written by transaction Ti, and no transaction Tj, where j < i in the serialization order, wrote such a tuple. The tuple t may or may not be in the correct final state. We prove by contradiction that neither is possible; hence the two hashes must be the same.
B.1. Troublesome tuple t is in the correct final state. First we consider the case where the extra tuple t is in the correct final state, but is not included in the auditor's hash over new tuples in L.
Consider what happens when t's transaction Ti (which we will call T for simplicity) runs. B.1.1. Why T must have read and written correct values, including t. We trust the TLOW DBMS to carry out its functions in its usual manner, including concurrency control. Since T is the first transaction in serialization order to exhibit behavior that differs from that needed to obtain the correct final state, and no untamper attacks occur, all the transactions that committed before T must have written the correct final values for the tuples that they inserted. Otherwise the audit would have failed, due to a mismatch between the tampered final state and the new tuples in L.
Further, because the DBMS uses its concurrency control functions correctly, it would have aborted T if T had read any dirty values written by aborted transactions. Since T was not aborted, this problem did not occur. Also, if T had read any tampered values, then the audit would have failed, because those values were not untampered before the audit began. Thus T must have read correct values when it ran. More precisely, T must have read the same values as if T1, . . . , Ti = T were run one by one against an initially empty database, with no attacks at all. Since T reads the same values in both cases, it will write the same final values in both cases. (We assume that T does not involve calls to the outside environment, e.g., to read time, other than to obtain the COMMIT timestamp.) B.1.2. Why t must be in L on disk. Recall that we trust the DBMS to carry out insertions of new tuples in its usual manner. Thus when T writes a tuple, that write is promptly reflected in a dirty page in the DBMS buffer pool. We also trust the DBMS buffers, because we require kernel patches that prevent tampering with dirty pages while in memory. Thus, since t is a final value written by T , the DBMS put a copy of the dirty parts of t's page (including t) on L before it wrote a COMMIT record for T to L. Since T committed, that part of L has reached disk by the time of the audit. Thus the auditor will eventually reach t in L; we assume that this copy of t will still contain a transaction ID T rather than T 's timestamp ts.
B.1.3. Why the auditor will include t in her hash of L. The auditor's initial sanity check determined that there was only one COMMIT record for T . As argued earlier, this record was not written by Mala. Due to write-ahead logging, the COMMIT record must appear after t in L. Thus when the auditor parses t in L, she cannot believe that T has already committed before T wrote t. Thus she will add the key and content for t to her data structure for T .
As T does eventually commit, the auditor will scan T 's COMMIT record and hash all of T 's inserted tuples. Since t is a final value for T , she should include t in her hash. Mala cannot regret tuples that are not yet committed, so she has no motivation to hide t's existence by making it appear that t is not a final value, i.e., T overwrote t. However, Mala may want to insert a backdated tuple t whose absence she regrets. To get a backdated tuple t into the DB, she can turn back the clock on the DBMS to the appropriate past date (r or more time units in the past). Then she can either submit a transaction that inserts t , or else tamper with the DB state in such a manner that T appears to overwrite t with t . In part B.1.3.1, we argue that these and any other attacks that turn back the DBMS server clock by r or more time units would have caused the audit to fail. Since the audit did not fail, these attacks must not have occurred.
Mala may have tried to overwrite t to cause desirable side effects: to introduce of backdated tuples whose absence she regrets, or remove old tuples whose presence she regrets. We argue in part B.1.3.2 that these attacks cannot succeed, and conclude that Mala will not have tried to overwrite t before T committed. Thus the auditor will recognize that t is a final value of T . The auditor must find T 's timestamp and substitute it into t before computing the hash. She will find T 's correct timestamp in L, because Mala cannot alter the timestamp while it is in the buffer pool or overwrite it on WORM, and because the auditor's L sanity check has guaranteed that there is only one timestamp for T . We conclude that the auditor does include t in her hash correctly, a contradiction of our initial assumption that t is excluded from her hash of the tuples inserted by T . B.1.3.1 Why backdating attacks fail. At some point (call it time 0 on the WORM), Mala may regret the absence of some tuple t from the DB and want to create a backdated version of t . For this to work, she must set back the DBMS clock to the time she would like t to be stamped with, which must be at least one regret interval in the past. (This is why we cannot support a zero regret interval. The argument here depends on the auditor being able to detect Mala's tampering with the DBMS server's clock, but no one can detect an "attack" that involves setting the clock back by zero units of time.) So that t will be included in the auditor's hash, Mala must get a copy of t onto L, followed by a COMMIT record for t . Acting fast, Mala can write the COMMIT record for t immediately after time 0 on the WORM server, with timestamp −r or earlier.
Since we trust the WORM server's clock, we trust the create and last write times for each file of L. Consider the file f of L in use at time 0 on the WORM. The create time of f must be later than −r/2, as it is still in use after time 0, when Mala appends material to L. The timestamp of the COMMIT record she appends is −r or earlier. Thus the auditor's checks will detect that the clocks on the WORM server and the server writing the COMMIT record differ by more than r/2 time units and the audit will fail. As the audit did not fail, Mala cannot have mounted such an attack.
The LDA approach is also subject to DBMS clock tampering attacks, and its authors proposed to thwart them by flushing the LDA compliance log buffers to disk every r time units. The argument given above shows that the LDA approach is flawed, and the DBMS actually needs to flush those buffers every r/2 time units, instead. TLOW also avoids the LDA requirement that the DBMS and WORM storage server clocks be roughly synchronized.
B.1.3.2. Why tampering with t will not have the side effect of adding/removing other regretted tuples. Perhaps Mala is overwriting t while T is running because it will cause a desirable side effect. The first such effect is to introduce a backdated tuple whose absence she regrets (e.g., due to a foreign key constraint). As argued above, the audit would have failed if she had carried out any backdating attack. The second such effect is to delete a tuple s whose existence she regrets, again through an integrity constraint. However, s will not be shredded; it will still be visible to temporal queries. If Mala wants to really get rid of s, she will have to overwrite or shred it, and the bogus overwrite of t by t does not help her.
B.2. Troublesome tuple t is not in the correct final state. Suppose that a tuple t is in the current DB state, but is not in the correct final state. Since the audit succeeded, t must be included in the auditor's hash of L. (This being the first audit, previous DB instance is empty.) Suppose that the first occurrence of t on L has transaction ID T as timestamp. Since t was included in the auditor's hash, a COMMIT record for T must appear later on L; otherwise T would not have been included in the serialization order. Since the auditor did a sanity check on L, L must have only one COMMIT record for T . Thus T qualifies as a "submitted transaction" in the theorem, and the correct final state must have included an invocation of T . Suppose that T = Ti in the serialization order. T 's COMMIT record tells the auditor what timestamp to use for t in her hash. As she included t in her hash, t must appear on L before the COMMIT record for T . There are only a few possible reasons why t might not be in the equivalent correct final state. The first possibility is that t is not in the equivalent correct final state because t was later overwritten by T . In that case, the auditor did not detect that the value for t was subsequently overwritten by T , and hence included it in her hash. If the auditor overlooked the subsequent overwrite, then one possibility is that the overwrite was not logged. But this is impossible, since the DBMS operates correctly and Mala does not tamper with the buffer pool. A second possibility is that the overwrite appears too late on L and the auditor ignored it. Since we trust the DBMS to log pages correctly, Mala must have inserted a fake COMMIT record for T . But then the auditor's sanity check would have observed two COMMIT records for T and the audit would have failed, which it did not. The third possibility is that Mala altered the DB state to contain t instead of t, and did not tamper with L. As the audit did not fail, Mala must have reverted pages to their correct content before the audit. But, this violates our assumption that Mala did not carry out any untamper attacks.
The only remaining possible reason is that Mala inserted the log record for t on L. According to the threat model, one possibility is that she wants to insert a copy of t that is backdated by at least one regret interval. But the arguments given earlier show that although she can tamper with the DBMS server's clock, she cannot backdate t by an entire regret interval without causing the audit to fail. Another possibility is that t is overwriting another value written by T , and Mala regrets the existence of that other value. However, Mala cannot regret that other value, since it is not even committed yet. Also, the argument given earlier shows that Mala cannot turn back the DBMS clock far enough to successfully overwrite t. A third possibility is that inserting of t will cause a side effect that meets Mala's needs, by creating a tuple s that is backdated by at least one regret interval, or by overwriting or shredding an existing tuple. As described earlier, these side effects are impossible. Nor can the spurious log record on L cause any ongoing or previous transaction to abort as the DBMS will not be aware of the page image. We conclude that if Mala inserted such a log record, it was for reasons outside the scope of our threat model. Thus, we have proved that the auditor extracts the serialization order correctly, and that the hash over new tuples in L is the same as the hash over tuples in this serialization order T1, . . . , Tn. Therefore, the actual final database state is also equivalent to that obtained by running transactions T1, . . . , Tn one by one on an initially empty database. The theorem follows.
Previous audits. Now consider the case where k previous audits have occurred. Since audits are rare and major events, the auditor can consult a trusted third party to see who was responsible for the previous audit, and obtain the public key of that auditor. With that public key, the auditor can check the digital signature on the snapshot from the previous audit, to verify that the snapshot is the one produced by the previous auditor. Since the snapshot, its associated hash H, and the corresponding digital signature are on WORM storage in non-appendable files, none of them can have been tampered with since they were created. We trust the previous auditor to have correctly created the snapshot and its audit hash Ho, and correctly signed them. Thus the hash value stored with the previous snapshot is trustworthy. The auditor adds this hash value to that computed over L. The remainder of the argument proceeds as for the first audit, and the theorem follows.
SPEEDING UP AUDITS
Official audits by an external authority are likely to be infrequent (e.g., once a year), so L may be extremely long and the audit may be very slow. Experiments with TLOW and LDA show that if we run a 10-warehouse TPC-C around the clock for one year, then the audit will take 10 days to process the log, plus the time to scan the current database instance and verify its integrity.
To reduce costs, we propose to do real-time trustworthy incremental auditing. This approach relies on an audit helper (AH) process that can run on the DBMS server (or on its own host, as long as its host and the WORM server keep their clocks within r/2 time units of each other). AH reads L from WORM as fast as L is written, finds the new tuples on L and hashes them in the same manner as an auditor would, and periodically writes the hashes to H in a special form discussed later. The auditor can only trust AH hashes that reach WORM within r time units after their transaction committed. As shown by experiments presented later, AH has a very small impact on transaction throughput, for three reasons: the log pages it reads are generally already in the file system cache on the DBMS server or WORM server, its computational overhead is quite small, and it imposes only a tiny write overhead on the WORM server.
If AH's hash of a new tuple reaches WORM more than r time units after that tuple is committed, then the auditor cannot use that late hash and must recompute it. To help the auditor identify late hashes, AH flushes H to WORM every r/2 time units. More precisely, every r/2 time units, AH appends (hv tid1 ptr1 · · · tidn ptrn) to H and flushes it to a new file on WORM, where tid1 · · · tidn are the IDs of the transactions whose COMMIT records AH has scanned since the last flush and whose commit timestamps are within the last r/2 time units; ptr1 · · · ptrn point to the COMMIT records in L for tid1 · · · tidn, respectively; and hv is the hash of the new tuples inserted by tid1 · · · tidn.
Detecting invalid H files. Mala cannot overwrite an existing tuple version by attacking AH, but she can insert a backdated tuple t as follows. First, she tampers with the DB instance so that it includes t.
Then she kills AH and replaces it by a tampered audit helper, TAH. Suppose that transaction T commits while TAH is running. TAH hashes the tuples inserted by T plus t, and writes the result out to H. The auditor will not recognize that the hash value for T includes t.
Mala's attack can be detected by hashing the tuples in L and comparing them to the hashes stored in L, but the whole point of AH is to entirely avoid scanning L. Catching an attack by spot-checking a randomly selected H file is unlikely. To counter the attack, we require AH to sign its H files using a key that Mala cannot easily obtain. For this, AH may rely on an inexpensive Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on the server where it runs, plus the ability to prove that it is a legitimate copy of an audit helper (i.e., certified code). The TPM contains a key seed, known to the auditor, that is used to generate a secret key k for each time epoch using a one-way hash function. AH uses a cryptographic hash function h k to compute h k (k, i), where i is the tuple hashes that AH is writing to H. Then AH can append h k (k, i) to H. The auditor knows the seed, which allows her to generate k quickly. As she scans H, she looks for and verifies the signatures (keyed hashes) that she encounters.
Handing AH crashes. If AH crashes, the DBMS can continue running, and vice versa. When the DBMS restarts, it will start a new transaction log file. AH must watch for this file to appear. When AH restarts, it starts scanning the most recently created file for L. AH must ignore new tuples that it finds in L whose PrevLSN (previous log sequence number, a field found in each transaction log record) is non-null, unless AH already has started a data structure for that transaction. This way, AH will only hash new tuples from transactions that made their first write after AH restarted.
Audit refinement to use H files. At audit time, the auditor must perform usual sanity checks on the create and last write times of each L file, and on the H files. Any H files written more than r/2 time units after the DBMS crashed, and before it came up again, must be discarded. Next, the auditor examines each H file to find its pointers to COMMIT records in L. (If there is no H file for an interval or the file fails this sanity check, then the auditor must perform traditional auditing for transactions active during the period.)
The auditor must also ensure that the COMMIT records that H points to are legitimate, i.e., not inserted in L by Mala. This involves a sanity check that the last write time (resp. create time) on the L file containing each COMMIT record is less than r/2 time units after (resp. before) the transaction's timestamp recorded in the COMMIT record. As its third sanity check, the auditor compares the last write time of the H file on the WORM to the earliest commit time for any transaction ID listed in that file. If the difference is more than r time units, the auditor must redo the hash of the new tuples.If the she only needs to compute the hashes for a few transactions, she can quickly find the relevant information for each of them by following the PrevLSN pointers for a transaction backwards through L, starting from its COMMIT record. After computing a hash value over the new tuples of all the transactions for which it could not use an H file, the auditor then adds the hash values from all the H files that it found to be trustworthy, to arrive at the final hash value. She computes the hashes over' the current instance and previous snapshot, and compares them as under the TLOW approach.
The other major cost of auditing is the time to scan and hash the current instance, which may become very large over the years. We propose to add this to the DB instance integrity check utility, which has to fetch and parse each page of the DB anyway, so the additional cost of hashing each tuple and reporting the sum is small.
BASIC FORENSIC ANALYSIS
The TLOW architecture and AH allow an auditor to quickly determine whether the database instance has been tampered with. However, for forensic investigations, it is often important to pinpoint the modified tuples. We propose a solution to this problem.
When an audit fails, the forensic analysis process steps through each table of the previous snapshot, computing a new relation Hashes that contains (t.k, H(t)) for each tuple t with key k and cryptographic hash H(t). Then the forensic analysis process steps through L, finding each new tuple t and computing its hash H(t ). The forensic analysis finds the key of t in Hashes and changes the value H(t) stored there to be ADD_HASH(H(t), H(t )). To make this fast, we can build a B + -tree over the key attributes of Hashes and use it to find each key as needed. Alternatively, we can scan the log and compute all the new (t .k, H(t )) values, sort them on k, and then do a zigzag join (i.e., merge join with auxiliary indices) of them with Hashes, updating the content of Hashes each time we find a matching tuple.
Finally, the forensic analysis considers each tuple in the current instance of the database, checking whether its hash is what is stored for its key k in Hashes, and marking the key k in Hashes as having been matched with a key from the current instance. This can be sped up by using any available B + -trees for the two relations. Mismatched hash values indicates tampering, as does the absence of k in Hashes. At the end of the pass over current DB, if any keys in Hashes have not been matched, that also indicates tampering. If audit failures are common, then after repair and successful re-audit, the auditor can sign Hashes and store it on WORM for future use.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Setup. To evaluate TLOW performance, we used the Shore implementation [24] of the industry standard TPC-C benchmark, ported to run on BerkeleyDB 4.7.25. The DBMS ran on a server with a Pentium dual core 2.8 GHz CPU, 512KB L2 cache, 4GB RAM, and a 1TB hard disk. We simulated the WORM server using a Pentium 2.8 GHz single core CPU, 512KB L2 cache, with a portion of its local disks exported as an NFS volume. The DBMS mounted the WORM volume over NFS and stored the logs there. We ran AH on the DBMS server. AH can be run on a separate server and still utilize of the warm WORM cache, but its overhead is so small that we left it on the DBMS server. We also measured LDA's performance in our setting where the WORM stored the LDA compliance log.
We ran 100,000 transactions with a 512 MB DBMS cache and a 10 warehouse TPC-C configuration, resulting in a 2.5 GB database. We ensured that the file system caches on the WORM and DBMS servers were cold at the start of each run. For runs without support for term-immutability, we used the DBMS's default maximum log file size of 10MB. When this size is reached, the DBMS starts a new log file, resulting in 232 log files per run, of size 2.32 GB. The log creation rate averaged 38 MB/min. For runs with support for term-immutability, every r/2 seconds we called a DBMS function to flush and close the log file and started a new log file. AH polls the log directory on the WORM, and on finding a new log file, it hashes the file's newly inserted tuples and flushes the results to an H log file on WORM every r/2 seconds.
TLOW and AH TPC-C performance. We measured TPC-C performance in the TLOW architecture with regret intervals r of 30 seconds, 2 minutes, and 5 minutes. We also measured TPC-C performance under the TLOW architecture, with an audit helper AH. The resulting TPC-C run times are shown in Figure 7 . With a 2 minute or a 5 minute regret interval, we have less than 1% overhead in all cases up to 100K transactions when using the TLOW architecture. For a 30 second regret interval, the overhead is always less than 2%. In general, the faster the DBMS generates log records, the lower the Figure 7 : TPC-C run times with unmodified BerkeleyDB, LDA with regret interval 300 sec., TLOW with regret interval 300 sec., TLOW with regret interval 120 sec., TLOW with regret interval 30 sec., and TLOW with AH and 30-sec. regret interval. As the overheads are less than 1% for both TLOW-300 and TLOW-120, less than 2% for TLOW-30, and less than 4% with TLOW-30-AH, the curves almost coincide. In contrast, LDA without hash-page-on-read had an overhead of 14%.
overhead will be. AH added less than 1.5% overhead, and processed L files much faster than the DBMS generated them. To compare TLOW with LDA, we ran TPC-C with LDA, with a regret interval of 5 minutes. The measured overhead (without the hash-page-on-read refinement) was 14%. For non-probabilistic detection of untamper attacks, previous experiments show that the extra overhead for hash-page-on-read refinement is 10% on our platform [16] .
Audit includes the tuple completeness check, the integrity check on the current DB instance, and (for non-probabilistic detection of untamper attacks) the check of the hashes of pages read by transactions. The integrity check must be done at regular intervals, even without auditing for compliance. The costly steps of the tuple completeness check are hashing the new tuples in L and in the current DB. Figure 8 shows that the new tuples of 100K TPC-C transactions on L can be hashed in less than a second when H files are available for all transactions; if no H files are available, hashing takes about 100 seconds. As AH can easily keep up with the DBMS, we expect that after a year, H files will be available for almost all committed transactions. This implies that the time to scan H files from a year of non-stop TPC-C will be just under two hours.
To hash the current DB, page fetches are a major expense. The overhead of parsing and hashing fetched pages after 100K transactions, given that the pages were already in the file system cache, was 8 seconds. Thus the time to parse and hash a year of TPC-C tuple versions is less than 20 hours. If an ordinary DB integrity check is being performed, then each page must be parsed anyway and the additional cost to hash the tuples is miniscule. We conclude that in practice, the tuple completeness check will be so affordable that the organization should be able to perform an informal audit whenever it runs a routine integrity check on its DB.
RELATED WORK
Researchers have looked into several aspects of compliance for database data. We have already described LDA [16] , which offers a different approach to the same problem that TLOW addresses. Another recent innovation is a framework for auditing changes to a database while respecting retention policies [13] . It focuses on policy based redaction and removal of sensitive information from the database and its history, and handling the uncertainties in answering audit queries The TLOW approach for ensuring that database contents are term-immutable can be combined with this framework, so that one can support audit queries over sensitive information while guaranteeing that tampering with contents or history can be detected. Researchers have addressed the related problem of writing and enforcing tuple retention and shredding policies, expressed as restrictions on the operations that can be performed on views [2] . Their approach relies on the DBMS to enforce the policies. TLOW can augment this by protecting the database contents against tampering by adversaries who gain superuser access, or even insiders with incentives to tamper with the data. For example, suppose that a skilled DBA opens the database file with a file editor or an uncertified copy of the DBMS, and removes or alters some of its content. TLOW can identify this tampering at the next audit. Tamperproof database audit logs are another direction of research. In one scheme [22] , the transactional data is cryptographically hashed by the DBMS, signed periodically by a trusted third-party notary, and then stored in the database. Later, a validator verifies the current database state using the certified hashes. If tampering is detected, a forensic analyzer helps to identify when and where the database was tampered with. One drawback of this approach is that newly added content can be tampered with until the next notarization, without subsequent detection. As the notaries are trusted third parties, it is hard to shrink the notarization interval below, say, once a day. The TLOW approach shrinks this window of vulnerability to a minute or less, with minimal impact on transaction throughput.
Many researchers have tackled the security problems associated with outsourced database and file management [6, 7, 15, 20, 25] , and cryptographic file systems [5, 9, 10, 18] . The high-level goals of outsourcing research are for the data owner to receive integrity guarantees for databases/files stored on untrusted servers, and correctness guarantees for DBMS/file system responses to user requests. The assumption is that the data owner is trustworthy and will not tamper with the data, but the storage server is untrustworthy. In data retention scenarios, the WORM storage server is trusted, but we do not trust the data owner who may have root access and powerful incentives to tamper with the data.
Data retention is just one important aspect of SOX compliance. Agrawal et al. [1] describe how databases can play an important role in helping companies comply with many other aspects of SarbanesOxley, and present several open research problems.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed TLOW, an efficient approach to supporting term-immutable databases for regulatory compliance. T-LOW stores the current DB instance on traditional storage and the transaction log on a low-cost WORM storage server; the transaction log is segmented in a manner that allows an auditor to detect a variety of attacks, including clock tampering. Our proof of correctness for TLOW sheds light on a variety of potential attacks, including one that causes trouble for LDA, a previously proposed approach.
Our experiments with TPC-C show that TLOW supports a regret interval as small as 2 minutes with less than 1% slowdown in transaction throughput. That is, 2 minutes after a transaction commits a new tuple, the tuple becomes term-immutable, in the sense that an auditor can detect any subsequent attempts to tamper with it. This is a significant performance improvement over LDA -the previous state of the art, and shows that TLOW is practical and efficient for OLTP applications where one can keep all past versions of tuples.
To make audits fast, we introduced a trustworthy audit helper function that has no significant impact on transaction performance, yet speeds up audits enormously, reducing the cost of auditing the transaction log by a factor of 100. We also show how to reduce the cost of hashing the current DB instance to just a few seconds, by piggybacking the task onto periodic database integrity checks.
